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ABSTRACT.1
In recent years, the growing Chinese presence in Latin America has triggered heated academic and 
policy debates, as well as social and political conict across countries in the region. Against this 
background, the present paper explores the specic characteristics taken on by this dynamic in the 
Bolivian case, by adopting a novel research strategy in which we tested these debates with a 
combined process-tracing analysis of the evolution of the structural geo-economic relationship 
between Bolivia and China, and a survey of the state of negative and positive perceptions of the 
Bolivian population about the growing presence of China in Bolivia. e objective was to attain a 
complete overview of the political implications of the structural changes in the sources of 
geopolitical power in the bi-lateral relationship. Empirically, there is room to conclude that the 
region and Bolivia are geo-economically turning more dependent on China and that relations are 
not benetting broad-based development; however, there is less room to talk about a deterministic 
relationship between the above and a direct geopolitical inuence in the region. Bolivian public 
opinion is divided in a way that mirrors the regional debate on the issue, and the divide has reached 
high levels of politicization, as it overlaps with an internally polarized political system. e Bolivian 
case is important because this dynamic could replicate in the region and dene the orientation of the 
region’s foreign policy towards China in the future.2 
INTRODUCTION.
In 1990 Yang Shangkun, then President of the People’s Republic of China, visited ve Latin 
American countries. is visit was the starting point of a series of high-level exchanges. By 2001 
President Jiang Zemin could complete a 12-day mission to the region, including visits to Argentina, 
Brazil, and Venezuela. In 2004 the new Chinese President, Hu Jintao, visited Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Cuba. Hu stated that China was willing to invest 100 billion dollars by 2014 in Latin 
America, and hoped that by 2010 trade between the two regions would equal the amount of the 
promised investment. However, in 2010 the two parties’ commercial exchange had exceeded 
expectations, reaching 140 billion dollars.
 
Decades of sustained economic growth, urbanization, and the consequent expansion of its middle 
classes had aroused Chinese interest in the importation of natural resources from Latin America, 
starting with oil, soybeans and iron. For example, in 2006 more than a third of Chilean exports were 
going to China, whilst in 2009 China became Brazil’s main trading partner. at same year, the 
Chinese Development Bank lent 10 billion dollars to Brazil, to be invested in the state-owned oil 
company Petrobras, in exchange for receiving 200,000 barrels of oil daily for the 10 following years. 
China had been engaged in an important commercial relationship with Peru since the early 1990s. 
Two decades later, the Chinese presence in the Andean countries had expanded to include Venezuela 
and Ecuador (Cerna, 2011).
While it is clear that China has expanded its strategic presence in Latin America, the nature and 
dynamics of this relation, as well as its implications for development and for domestic and foreign 
policy, have not been investigated in depth. As one of the most renowned experts in the topic, 
1. is research would not have been possible without the nancial cooperation of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Bolivia
2. e authors would like to thank their research assistants Solange Sardán and Nicole Jordán.
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
3
Enrique Dussel-Peters, asks, “What is the extent of its new relations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean? Is it a win-win, or must Latin American countries make adjustments now to ensure that 
China does not erode the region’s political, economic, and social transformations over the last 
decade?” (Dussel-Peters, 2015: 1).
 
Taking into account that the Chinese presence is a more recent phenomenon in Bolivia than in other 
Latin American countries, there is a clear need to deepen the analysis of the Bolivian case. In less 
than a decade, China has become one of the country’s main trading partners (according to several 
economic ow measures) but this increasing presence has equally become one of the most 
controversial of topics. To illustrate, in December 2016, there were several demonstrations and riots 
in front of the Chinese Embassy in La Paz, demanding that the Bolivian Government expel all 
Chinese companies from Bolivian territory.
 Objectives and Methodology
In the framework of the greater Chinese economic presence in Latin America, and the academic 
policy debates and increasing levels of internal social and political conict it is generating, the 
objective of this paper is to explore the specic characteristics taken on by this dynamic in the 
Bolivian case. To accomplish that, the paper adopts a novel research strategy in which we test these 
debates in the Bolivian case by combining a process-tracing analysis of the evolution of the structural 
geo-economic relationship between Bolivia and China, with a survey of the state of the Bolivian 
public’s perceptions on the issue. e objective of this method is to contrast public perceptions with 
empirical structure and dynamics to attain a combined overview of the political implications of the 
structural changes in the sources of geopolitical power in the bi-lateral relationship.
In the rst section of this paper, we present a general overview of the academic and political debates 
about the geopolitical and development consequences of the growing presence of China in Latin 
America. In the second part, we analyse the main empirical data points, outlining the structure and 
dynamics of the economic exchanges between China and the region in general and Bolivia 
specically. In the third part we explore in depth the implications for Bolivia’s internal politics, 
looking at the interrelations between the empirical data and the state of Bolivian public opinion in 
early 2017. Finally, we oer our main conclusions.
THE IMPACTS OF THE INCREASED CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE REGION.
China’s emergence as an economic and political power is one of the greatest geopolitical trends of the 
21st century. In Dussel-Peters’ words, “the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a 
superpower … has reshaped international power relationships and solidied the shift of the world’s 
commercial and nancial ows to the North Pacic” (Dussel-Peters, 2015: 7). In concrete terms, the 
Chinese economy has expanded at such an accelerated pace during the past three decades as to 
achieve consolidation of the country as a major global economic power. Currently, China is in some 
analyses the world’s largest economy,3 the largest manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of 
foreign exchange reserves.
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All of the above happens against the background of a turbulent geopolitical scene: “e international 
system is at a historical moment of renewal. As the unipolar order declines, various forces are rising, 
among which China has already become an important force in constructing a new world order.”  (Li, 
2014: 1) In a parallel way, Latin America 
At the global level, “the re-emergence of China as a major global power has led to a considerable 
debate over the likely consequences for the rest of the world” (Jenkins, 2010: 810). In our specic 
area of interest, a debate arises, notwithstanding that China has provided several Latin American 
countries vast nancial resources, because of the potential disadvantages that this might bring in the 
geopolitical realm. ere is mounting evidence pointing to the potential diculties that the 
increased Chinese presence in Africa in the past decades has wrought. is topic is one of the most 
debated ones, not only in everyday politics but also in academia, and a similar debate is now gaining 
prominence in Latin America. As Cypher & Wilson (2015: 1) argue, “most of the literature [in the 
region] seems to fall along a continuum with complementarity at one pole and dependency at the 
other”. e rst trend, led by authors like Atilio Borón and Monica Bruckmann, is in favour of 
deepening ties with China because it nds that the relationship can be complementary, with several 
benets for Latin America. e underlying thesis supporting this position is that the political and 
economic context is increasingly negative for the West, and China is a strategic partner for the region 
(Hernandez, 2016). is is not only because it provides economic resources (Vasquez, 2010), but 
also because it has become a political option to the dominance exercised by the US over the past 50 
years (Borón, 2013; Tokatlian, 2007). Having China as an option to engage with would give the 
region freedom of action to pursue a more autonomous course (Ellis, 2009).
In addition – and from an economic point of view, – a closer relationship with China is seen as 
benecial in that it has already enabled the region to achieve unprecedented levels of growth and 
improvement of social conditions. Cypher and Wilson (2015: 6) sum this up:
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is immersed in a stage of transition, in which dierent processes converge in a logic that does not 
acquire clear conceptualization. It is a post-liberal or post-hegemonic stage that can be imagined from 
the existence of a series of indicators of a change in the scenario. ese include the priority of the 
political agenda in regional multilateralism; the vision of free trade as an instrument, not as an end; the 
recovery of the development agenda; the assignment of a greater role to the State; and greater emphasis 
on the positive agenda of integration. Relations with China are built at this stage of the historical 
development of Latin America in a scenario that far exceeds the consequences of the end of the Cold 
War (Bonilla & Millet, 2015: 10).
China played a major role in the commodities boom; both in hard commodities such as minerals and 
in soft commodities such as monocropped agriculture and livestock in various Latin American 
countries … During the boom, respectable rates of economic growth were experienced across South 
America … e average annual rate of real per capita income growth was 4.1 percent from 2003 
through 2011. us, South America experienced an impressive 78 percent improvement in the average 
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In sum, this tendency anchors the notion that Latin America has a historic opportunity to develop 
a long-term strategic relationship with China due to the structural complementarity between the 
two regions (Bonilla & Millet, 2015). is, in turn, would enable it to break the dependency that 
marked its insertion into the international system, as the main pillar of Chinese diplomacy is 
cooperation. Bruckmann (2016: 105-106) asserts, “China’s policy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean resumes the spirit of Bandung in its fundamental principles of cooperation, economic 
and social development, based on shared benets and armation of the countries of the South in 
the international sphere. Certainly, these principles are radically dierent from those underscoring 
the free trade treaties that the United States (US) tried to implement in the region.”
On the opposite side of the Latin American academic debate we nd the argument against 
deepening the relationship with China in the sceptical view that its overarching foreign policy goal 
is to achieve its own economic (Galvez, 2012) and geopolitical (Muñoz, 2008) objectives. More 
specically, the advocates of this position assert that China’s current primary interests are to secure a 
supply of natural resources necessary to feed its manufacturing industry, and latterly, to maximize 
returns on the huge amount of capital that lies in their reserves4 (Campanini, 2017; Cesarin & 
Moneta, 2005; Galvez, 2012; Svampa, 2013). is Chinese policy would be part of a worldwide 
competition among industrialized countries, in order to secure access to key supplies with the 
objective of strengthening their value chains (Fornillo, 2016). As a result, the argument goes, its 
cooperation for international development is only part of a foreign policy of expansion; just like all 
other world powers have done before (Power & Mohan, 2010).
 
From the perspective of the geopolitics of development, deepening the relationship with China 
would be a strategic mistake that reproduces the longstanding primary-goods dependency model in 
the region, hindering in turn much-needed production development agendas (Bolinaga & Slipak, 
2015; Hernandez, 2016; Slipak, 2014; Svampa, 2013). is line of thought is led by Maristella 
Svampa, who coined the term “Commodities Consensus” to explain that in recent years the region 
has entered a new stage:
4. e value of Chinese foreign exchange reserves peaked at just over 4 trillion US dollars in June 2014.
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annual per capita income growth rate from that attained during the period 1990-2002 … Stronger 
growth also underwrote appreciable increases in social spending in many nations, which tended to 
induce further growth. Poverty rates fell at an impressive rate in several countries. Income dispersion 
between the middle class and the poor was reduced somewhat. e latter eect was widely hailed as 
evidence that Latin America´s notorious levels of income inequality had been somewhat undercut.
In it, governments accept … an insertion into the global production and accumulation system as 
suppliers of products with low value-added content, taking advantage of the high international prices. 
In this way, they prioritize the development and the expansion of extractive mega-projects, and they 
are enclaves of export to the manufacturing centers of the planet. In some of these cases, the income 
from these activities is appropriated by the State for being used in progressive policies. However, all 
these governments – despite their dierences – assume the need to strengthen what Svampa calls a 
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e biggest impact of the Chinese presence in the region, for this line of thought, is that, far from 
providing an option to keep pursuing structural change, the increasing Chinese trade and foreign 
investment is only deepening the region’s dependency on the income generated by the export of 
primary goods (Cypher & Wilson, 2015); and thence backsliding to an extractivist development 
model (Slipak, 2014).5
e available data shows why this tendency nds the relationship with China disadvantageous. 
Regarding trade in goods, “the structure of trade between China and Latin America has been 
increasingly characterized by the centre-periphery type of relation with Latin America exporting 
primary products and resource-based manufactures in exchange for Chinese manufactured goods … 
with increasing technology components” (Jenkins, 2012: 20). In addition, there are several 
associated issues that only worsen the case. 
Regarding capital ows, the main issue for the region – just like with trade – is that they are destined 
mostly for natural resources and energy (Ray et al., 2015; Woping, 2009), with scarce technology 
and knowhow transfer (Hernandez, 2016). Moreover, even though China’s foreign policy is guided 
by the principle of non-intervention in domestic issues, the loans it provides to Latin American 
governments are generating other kinds of issues. It is a known fact that China’s international 
cooperation does not follow the classic model of conditionality; but its operational conditions are 
proving to be stricter (Gallagher et al., 2013). Particularly, the biggest conict to have arisen is that 
typical contracts contain “alternative conditionality” clauses forcing governments to agree hiring 
Chinese companies and workers, and buying Chinese inputs (Roldán et al., 2016). 
Finally, these increasing trade ows have several social and environmental impacts. As Svampa 
(2013: 34) states, “this neo-extractivism model is destroying economies and biodiversity by 
dangerously deepening the process of land grabbing, expelling or displacing rural, farming or 
indigenous communities, and eroding citizen decision-making processes”. Furthermore, a problem 
that is gaining more attention is the physical presence of Chinese companies, since they do not 
always abide by the rules. ere have been several public scandals over corruption in the hiring 
process and the execution of projects – mostly governmental, – but also because of the lack of 
compliance with labour and environmental laws (Girado, 2015).
 
To sum up, this school of thought asserts that the widening relationship with China reintroduces an 
all-too-familiar historical pattern in the region: dependency as the main form of insertion into the 
5.  As Bolinaga & Slipak (2015) explain, structural change is a productive transformation which entails an expansion and 
diversication of industrial production that is conducive to the generation of added value. According to the Latin American 
Structuralist theory, this is the only way to reach a higher development since the export of natural resources will only reproduce 
a centre-periphery type of relation. Svampa (2013) and Wanderley (2011) go further and assert that, for the region, this 
structural change should seek to establish a post-development model that has both industrial production and respect for the 
environment as main pillars.
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neo-extractivist development model as an inevitable destination, an irrevocable truth, a necessary path 
to development (Slipak, 2014: 112).
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global political economy (Hernandez, 2016). Hence, Latin American countries are facing the 
dilemma of increasing their commercial links with China, resulting in an increase of trade ows, 
without compromising its political autonomy and own development (Bolinaga & Slipak, 2015). 
Moreover, for countries like Bolivia and Ecuador this is specially complicated since the 
neo-extractivist model countervails the ocial development model known as Vivir Bien (“living 
well”); a term coined by former Bolivian Minister of Foreign Aairs David Choquehuanca, which is 
supposedly based on the harmony that should exist between man and nature (Gudynas, 2011; Lang 
& Mokrani, 2012).
EMPIRICS.
 Trade in goods
Latin America
As stated by Bonilla & Millet (2015: 5), “the unprecedented dynamics of China’s economic growth 
have resulted in an increasingly important participation in global trade”. Undeniably, Latin America 
has greatly intensied its relations with this Asian country in recent decades. While in 2000 2% of 
Chinese imports were composed of Latin American goods, in 2013 these constituted 7% of its total 
imports. However, these changes have had a dierential impact on both regions. e expansion of 
the commercial relationship has made China the second-largest trading partner of Latin America, 
slightly above the European Union. On the other hand, Latin America is still far from being one of 
China’s main trading partners. is is clearly reected in the trade balance in Figure 1. 
In addition, as is observable in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1, Latin America has a less balanced and 
diversied relationship with China compared to the rest of the world, in terms of the level of 
technological transformation of its exports. Less than 5% of exports to China have medium or high 
technological content, while more than 60% of the imports are at those levels of transformation. 
Also, the region’s exports are highly concentrated, since a small group of commodities – soybeans, 
minerals, oil – account for more than 80% of the total (Ray et al., 2015; Bonilla & Millet, 2015).
 
is trade asymmetry presents a series of associated factors that only worsens the case. First, due to 
the large gap between exports and imports, the trade decit of the region as a whole is constantly 
widening. Second, the expansion of the sectors associated with natural resources has not boosted the 
development of new technological capacities in the region, and thus the productivity gap has also 
widened (Rosales & Kuwayama, 2012). ird, an inverse substitution is actually happening, i.e. the 
production of manufactures in the region is diminishing because Chinese eciency is displacing 
competitors, not only inside the countries counterparties to the China trade, but also in their partner 
countries members of regional integration blocs (Cypher & Wilson, 2015).
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Looking at both Table 1 below and Figure 1 above, it is clear that in the last two and a half decades 
the structure of Latin America-China trade relations has undergone an important transformation, 
characterized by a sustained increase in the volume of products exported from our region to the 
Asian country, and vice versa. According to a report by ECLAC (2015) – the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, – trade between both regions has 
increased 22 times since 2000. However, it is also important to note that, despite the increased 
volume of Latin American exports to China, its composition remains concentrated mainly in natural 
resources, especially minerals, hydrocarbons, and agricultural products (mostly soyabeans).
 
As the volume of Latin American exports to China increased, so did the percentage of natural 
resources (Figure 2 and Figure 3). is was accompanied by a decrease of manufactured and 
agricultural exports to China. e volume of exported agricultural products was reduced by one 
third between 1999 and 2013, while the volume of exported manufactures was reduced by almost 
two thirds in the same period (Ray et al., 2015). Concededly, the volume of the region’s 
manufactured exports to the rest of the world was generally reduced, but this reduction was by only 
Working Paper No. 2. 2018.
Figure 1: Latin America, trade balance with China, 2000-2013, US$ millions
Source: ECLAC, 2015
Table 1: Composition of Latin American exports to China (in and type of product)
Source: Adapted from Ray et al. (2015)
1999
2013
46%
Agricultural 
products
Natural
Resources
Total 
ManufactureManufacturesYear
31%
25%
56%
29%
12%
58%
44%
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a quarter in the period in question, well below the variation in the composition of manufactures 
exported to China. In contrast, Latin American exports of non-renewable natural resources have 
gone from a quarter to more than half of what Latin America sells to China. As Bonilla & Millet 
(2015: 10) put it, "Latin America is an area that produces precisely what the Asian power needs. e 
link between both regions goes beyond a political conjuncture and illustrates the current global 
scenario and the way in which production is organized at that level of the international system."
In view of the foregoing authors, we can corroborate that despite the great increase in trade volume 
and the large inow of capital into the region, there are "three challenges in trade relations between 
China and Latin America: 1) the inter-industrial nature of trade between China and most of the 
countries in the area, 2) the lack of diversication in the products that the Latin American 
economies export to the Chinese market, and 3) the existence of a decit in the trade balance of 
most countries in the region with China" (Roldán et al., 2016: 26).
Working Paper No. 2. 2018.
Figure 2: Structure of Latin American trade with the world and China, according to technology intensity, 2013, in %
Source: ECLAC, 2015
Figure 3: Evolution of Latin American exports to China, 2000-2013, US$ millions
Source: ECLAC, 2015
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Finally, if we analyse the data on main trading partners in Table 2, we nd how signicant the 
Chinese presence is today. In the case of exports, this country ranks among the top export 
destinations of six of the ten South American countries. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the 
United States and Brazil still remain important export markets for both the Andean Community 
(CAN) and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). Moving on to analyse imports, the trend is 
much more acute, China being currently the rst or second trading partner of all but one. Even 
though these data follow the world trend, it is interesting that purchases of Chinese products have 
surpassed even those of the United States in the case of the Andean Community, and of Argentina 
in the case of MERCOSUR.
Bolivia
In order to understand the increasing importance of China for Bolivia’s international trade, it is 
necessary to review it in perspective. Regarding exports, Table 3 shows sales to China in 2000 were 
at such a low level that they did not even reach 1% of the total. In 2015, however, China was already 
the fth main partner, representing 7% of total Bolivian exports. is is an important fact, as sales 
to China are below only Brazil and Argentina, which are recipients of Bolivian natural gas exported 
through gas pipelines, and also below the United States and Colombia, which were traditionally 
Bolivia's main trading partners.
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Chile
% %
15,6 18,81 2
1 2
37 3
2 2
2 2
5 1
6 2
8 2
1 1
1 1
19 17
0,2 15
15,5 15,3
18,9 16,3
6,7 19
3,6 19,2
3,9 15,7
23,5 22,8
28,5 24,1
Table 2: China’s position as trading partner to South American countries, including percentage of total trade
Source: Adapted from www.trademap.org
Country
Exports
Position among trading partners Position among trading partners
Imports
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From the perspective of China, we nd that, in general terms, Bolivia is insignicant. In 2015, 
imports from Bolivia were so little that it ranked 97th among its trading partners, with less than 
0.0001% of the total. To understand this situation, we can recall that in the same year, Brazil ranked 
9th, making up 2.9% of the total Chinese purchases from the world. Chile ranked 20th with 1.2% 
of the total.
Hence, the real magnitude of the increase in trade relations between Bolivia and China only 
becomes evident when we turn to look at Bolivian imports. Table 4 shows that China went from 
being Bolivia’s 7th-largest trading partner in 2000, with 3% of the total, to 1st in 2015, with 18%. 
Reckoning the rate over these 15 years, imports from China grew by 2,406%.
From China’s perspective, nevertheless, the Bolivian market is still insignicant to the Asian giant, 
ranking only 127th with less than 0.001% of its total exports to the world. If we analyse the same 
data for the whole region, China’s main export destination is Brazil, in 23rd place, with 1% of the 
total; followed by Chile, in 33rd place, with 0.6%.
Colombia Brazil
United States
Argentina
Colombia
China
Japan
South Korea
Peru
Belgium
United Arab Emirates
United States
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Brazil
Uruguay
Peru
Venezuela
Belgium
Argentina
% %2000 2015
Growth
2000-2015
Table 3: Bolivia, main export partners, 2000 and 2015, in US$ and %
Data: Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
16
15
13
13
13
6
5
4
3
2
1
2
3
4
714%
378%
2382%
214%
7700%
11265%
18746%
442%
576%
139541%
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
14
11
9
7
6
5
5
4
3
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Analysing the whole bilateral trade between Bolivia and China in Figure 4, we observe that, 
consistent with the regional trend, it began to increase only in the year 2000. A signicant dierence 
with the rest of the Latin American countries is that it experienced a noteworthy growth only after 
the year 2008. Moreover, although exports increased, it was not in the same proportion as imports. 
Exports went from $16,000 in 1992 to $434 million in 2014; while imports went from $7.5 million 
in 1992 to more than $1,800 million in 2014. Inevitably, the trade balance is negative for Bolivia, 
and it has increased from $7.5 million in 1992 to $1.377 million in 2014. 
If we deepen the analysis by looking at the ten main Bolivian exports (Table 5), we can draw several 
conclusions. First, raw materials reach 99% of total sales; no wonder that nine out of the ten main 
exports are minerals and oil derivatives. e concentration of exports in a few commodities is so high 
that the rst two leading exports comprise 64% of the total, and the rst three, 80%. Second, the 
Chinese market is very important for Bolivia’s exports of antimony, boron oxide, copper, and gold; 
representing more than half of the sales of each commodity by Bolivia to the world. irdly, 
analysing the 5th column, we nd that, although Bolivia does not represent even 0.1% of China’s 
total purchases from the world, Bolivia is an important source of tin, as it represents almost half of 
China’s purchases. With a much smaller share of the Chinese market, yet also with interesting values, 
 are Bolivian zinc and silver, which share 13% and 14% of the Chinese market, respectively.
United States China
Brazil
Argentina
United States
Peru
Japan
Chile
Mexico
Germany
Colombia
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Japan
Peru
China
Spain
Mexico
Colombia
% %2000 2015
Growth
2000-2015
Table 4: Bolivia, main import partners, 2000 and 2015
Data: Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
22
16
14
8
5
5
3
3
2
2
1
2
3
4
2406%
466%
262%
128%
492%
379%
162%
477%
4656%
299%
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
16
12
11
6
5
5
3
2
2
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 2. 2018.
13
Figure 4: Bilateral trade between Bolivia and China, 1992-2014, in US$ millions
Data: www.redalc-china.org
Products
Percentage
in total 
Exports
Share in 
Bolivian 
exports (in %)
Equivalent 
Tari faced by 
Bolivia
Bolivian share 
in Chinese 
imports (in %)
Table 5: Bolivia’s main exports to China, 2015
Data: Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)
Total
Zinc ores and concentrates
Silver ores and concentrates
Unwrought tin, not alloyed
Lead ores and concentrates
Copper ores and concentrates
Oxides of boron; boric acids
Precious-metal ores and 
concentrates (excluding silver ores 
and concentrates)
Borates, natural, and concentrates 
thereof, whether or not calcined, 
and natural boric acids...
Wood, sawn or chipped lengthwise, 
sliced or peeled, whether or not 
planed, sanded or end-jointed...
Antimony ores and concentrates
7  0,03
36 17 0 13,3
28 21 0 14,1
16 26 3 45,3
7 22 0 2,3
4 58 0 0,1
3 57 0 20,9
2 27 4 7,6
1 58 6 3,3
1 44 0 0,1
0 69 0 1,7
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Respecting imports, as Table 6 shows, despite 57% of the products imported from China being 
consumer goods in 2000, by 2015 this had fallen drastically to 26%; whilst also in 2015 each of 
intermediate and capital goods comprised 37%. is shows that, consistent with the world trend, 
purchases from China increasingly include products with medium and high technological content. 
However, given that smuggling is a critical problem in Bolivia, with almost two third of its economy 
being informal, this data cannot be used conclusively. Imports of consumer goods from China 
represent most of the smuggling into the country, entering mostly via Iquique and other Chilean 
ports.
 
 Foreign Direct Investment
Since the early 1990s, foreign direct investment from China to the world has grown steadily. But this 
has happened in two distinct stages. China’s participation in worldwide investment did not vary 
greatly between 1990 and 2000, only inching up from 0.34% to 0.79%. It was after 2001 that there 
has been a signicant increase in Chinese participation as an international source of capital, 
encouraged by factors like governmental incentives to all kinds of companies (Lombard, 2009). is 
was a policy known as Go Out, adopted in 2001 as a mandate to look for business opportunities 
abroad, and included state support to Chinese businessmen.
CUODE
CUODE
Value ($us.) Value ($us.)
CUODE
Data: Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)
Table 6: Bolivia’s imports from China, according to Use and Economic Destination (CUODE), 2000 and 2015
%
5739,527,394Consumer Goods
Intermediate Goods
Capital Goods
TOTAL
22,298,792
7,894,982
69,736,073
308,461,466
447,802,918
439,505,456
1,195,915,108
32
11
%
26
37
37
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Today Latin America does not exceed 15% of the total Chinese FDI outows, yet the volumes are 
highly signicant because of the smaller size of Latin America’s economies, and because of the size of 
FDI inows. Additionally, as Roldán mentions,
[s]ince 2010, China's direct foreign investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean has 
experienced a signicant growth, gradually transforming the relationship with regional economies, 
from one mainly dominated by commercial transactions (the purchase of primary products from the 
region and the sale of industrial manufactures), to one in which Chinese companies have an important 
physical presence in Latin America, contributing not only to the generation of employment, but also 
as a source of income for Local Governments and as protagonists in the construction of transport 
infrastructure, telecommunications and tourism. As a consequence of this change of approach, China 
has now a greater impact on the socio-political dynamics in Latin America and has expanded its soft 
power in the area ... In this process, Chinese companies have begun to consolidate as local actors and 
are beginning to understand how to use this inuence to manage risks and look for business 
opportunities in the Latin American area. (Roldán, 2016: 76)
Figure 4: Bilateral trade between Bolivia and China, 1992-2014, in US$ millions
Source: Reportes de Saldos y Flujos de Capital Privado Extranjero del Banco Central de Bolivia
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6. Because these countries are tax havens, the probability that they are not the nal destination is very high (Rosales & Kywayama, 2012).
7. After a decade of strong relations, due to the economic and political crisis that President Maduro is facing, in January 2015 China 
denied him the new loan he asked for (US$16 billion).
It is important to note that these ows are not equally distributed throughout the region: a few 
countries receive the lion’s share of Chinese capital (Figure 5). e data show that, besides the ows 
from the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands,6 Brazil, Peru and Venezuela received 59% 
of all FDI in Latin America in 2012 in terms of stock value. Respecting the number of projects, 
Brazil, Mexico and Chile have taken 51% of the total. By 2016 the situation had changed slightly: 
Brazil and Peru are still the top destinations, but the dierence lies in the fact that Venezuela has 
dropped to 7th place; while Mexico is in third, according to stock value.7
Narrowing the analysis specically to Bolivia, one must emphasize, in the rst place, that the volume 
of FDI received in this country has always been signicantly lower than in neighbouring countries. 
Even so, considering the small size of the Bolivian economy, these volumes have had great impact. 
e data show that since 2000, the composition of the countries sending FDI to our country has 
greatly varied; yet it shows a pattern in terms of the three highest investors. e United States was 
the most important one from 2000 to 2009, excepting 2008; in fact, during this period its average 
participation was more than one third of the total, reaching its maximum in 2006 with 46.7%. 
Since 2010 there has been a change of trend, as the United States’ importance has diminished, falling 
to fourth place after Spain, Sweden and France. us, in the following years we see that the most 
important partner, according to FDI inows, has been Spain, which has occupied rst place from 
2010 to 2015, excepting 2011. During that ve-year period, Spain’s FDI levels averaged 27.67% of 
the total inows, with a peak of 33.3% in 2013. By 2015 it was clear that the European Union had 
replaced the USA as the main capital source for Bolivia, with 68% of total inows, while 
MERCOSUR accounted for 10% and the United States for 7%. 
Figure 6: Bolivia: FDI inows, Chinese and totals, US$ millions 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB)
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8. Reporte de saldos y ujos de capital privado extranjero en Bolivia, Banco Central de Bolivia
Turning to China, we corroborate that it is not signicant as a source of foreign investment in 
Bolivia. As can be seen in Figure 6, from 2000 to 2015 its average participation did not exceed 
0.61% of the total received by Bolivia. Nevertheless, one must highlight the recent trend, as in the 
last 2 years there has been an important increase, reaching US$72.097 million in 2015, even though 
this barely represents 6% of the total.
Regarding sectors, Figure 7 details those worth mentioning: rst, except for the years 2014 and 
2015, the values in the period depicted above are extremely low; second, the three sectors attracting 
the most capital were hydrocarbons, mining and commerce. Although hydrocarbons have attracted 
more FDI overall, from 2010 to 2013 Chinese FDI was directed only to commerce. If we narrow 
the analysis to the ows in 2015, the trend is clear: 98% of the total was destined to mining, gas and 
oil. If we compare this data with Latin America and the world, we see high alignment, as these are 
the sectors that have always attracted the attention of foreign investors.8 Roldán (2015) states that 
China has great interest in the purchase of oil and mining because these are key inputs to 
maintaining its position as an industrial power. Although it also produces its own oil and several 
minerals, its demand has far exceeded its domestic supply since the 1990s, which is why it had to “go 
out” into the world to nd supplies.
 Chinese loans (Foreign Debt)
Another way in which China has increased its presence in the world is, again, through capital 
outows, but in the form of state loans rather than investment. ese follow the international 
cooperation policies of both China and the host countries. Unlike investments, they represent 
external debt for the recipient country and must be repaid with interest within a certain period of time.
Figure 7: Evolution of Chinese FDI in Bolivia, in US$ millions
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB)
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It is undeniable that, in addition to the increase in trade ows, China's inter-state loans are the great 
phenomenon of China's outward expansion. It is, moreover, one that has been charged with 
controversy, beginning in Africa and continuing to Latin America. As Gallagher notes:
 
Regarding recipient countries, the same phenomenon as in the case of FDI is observed: a few 
countries have received the majority of the loans, the four main ones being Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina and Ecuador, whose credits were loaned through the Development Bank of China (BDC) 
and the China Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). ere is also a noteworthy gap between Venezuela 
and the other three, as this country has received US$56.3 billion since 2000, or 47.44% of the total 
money loaned. Noteworthier still is that the Latin American expectation that this increase in lending 
would be used for public policies promoting industrialization met a dierent reality:
Since 2005, China has granted approximately 86 billion dollars in loan commitments to Latin 
American countries. e amount of loans is greater than the ones granted by the World Bank (WB), 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Export and Import Bank of the United States in the 
same period. China has become an additional source of nancing for the region, especially for those 
countries that have problems accessing world capital markets. However, the benets and disadvantages 
are not always so clear. For example, although loan conditions appear to be less stringent, some 
nancing packages, such as that of the China Development Bank, are more demanding than those of 
the World Bank; Chinese banks do not overlap western nancing, focusing on dierent sectors and 
countries; although China does not impose political conditions, it does demand purchases of 
equipment from the beneciary countries; Chinese environmental guidelines do not operate with the 
same intensity as their Western counterparts. (Gallagher et al., 2013: 1)
Figure 8: Bolivia, main creditors (bilateral and multilateral), in US$ million
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB); Own Elaboration
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It is therefore necessary to further investigate Chinese lending to Bolivia, to understand its 
magnitude and its evolution. Figure 8 shows that Bolivia’s two main creditors from 1996 to 2016 
have been the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Andean Financing Corporation 
(CAF), recently rebranded as the Development Bank of Latin America, amounting to 30% and 29% 
of the total in 2016, respectively. In addition, although the IADB was always the main one, the Evo 
Morales Administration increased its debt mainly with CAF, which is what made it the second 
largest creditor. is was predictable, given that one of Morales’s campaign promises was to evict 
neoliberalism. For that purpose, CAF is seen as a partner. In third and fourth place we have the 
World Bank and China, with 11% and 8%, respectively.
 
Despite the fact that China is only in fourth place among main creditors, there are three points that 
deserve highlighting, to better understand China’s real importance. First, Chinese loans have grown 
almost 20 times since 1996, from US$22 million to US$680 million in 2016. Secondly, this increase 
is a more recent phenomenon compared to other Latin American countries as, until 2011, Chinese 
loans were almost insignicant. irdly, as Figure 9 shows, the loan increases have made China the 
largest bilateral creditor, with almost 80% of the total, surpassing the next ones (Brazil and 
Germany) more than tenfold.
e data show that the general trend of Latin American countries is to deepen their extractive matrix 
-except for Mexico- ... e weight of China in encouraging this inclination is important and will 
continue as it is directly related to its objective of consolidating its policy for the region, obtaining 
natural resources in its primary state. (Campani, 2017: 16)
Figure 9: Bolivia, foreign bilateral debt, according to creditor, 2016, in %
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB); Own Elaboration
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For a better understanding of Chinese lending to Bolivia, mention must be made of the large loan 
approved two years ago, whose execution is still in planning. In October 2015 Bolivia’s 
Vice-President made an ocial state visit to China to strengthen economic and commercial ties. 
After several meetings, a US$7 billion loan agreement was reached, to be used mainly on 
infrastructure.9 e great importance of this loan lies in the fact that, comparing all the data in this 
section, it will represent an increase of 100% in Bolivia’s total external indebtedness and be the 
largest loan Bolivia has ever contracted. At the moment, there are no ocial data on its execution. 
e reason why that process is taking so long is because of Bolivia’s and China’s divergent visions: 
China destined the loan to infrastructure, but Bolivia is prioritizing industry.
 Chinese companies in Bolivia
To complete the analysis, we must address the presence of Chinese companies in the country – 
important conduits of the Chinese presence in Bolivia, as well as sources of the perceptions shaping 
the Bolivian public’s opinion of the Chinese presence. For this purpose, we must break down not 
only the sectors in which they work, but also the type of sale they make (goods or services), and the 
conditions under which they operate. A priori we know that there is a strong tie between the loans 
made by the Chinese government and the operation of its companies in dierent countries: the ones 
that follow China’s foreign policy in order to ensure the provision of resources. 
Chinese companies settle in Latin America to work in the extraction of natural resources, with 
emphasis on oil and mining, and with low presence in manufacturing and services – mostly in the 
automotive and banking sectors (Girado, 2015). e entry into the Latin American market was not 
easy, as these companies encountered many diculties, ranging from cultural and management 
issues to interpretation of current labour laws, and from relations with local and national 
governments to social and environmental conicts.
 
Despite this, the data show that ever more Chinese companies are starting up activities in the region. 
us, two big questions arise: Why is it that countries allow or encourage the incursion of these 
Chinese companies into their territory? What are the objectives and incentives that Chinese 
companies pursue and act on to operate in dierent countries around the world? 
Regarding the rst question:
Regarding the second question, the operation of Chinese companies in many countries has the same 
objectives as any company in the world, but with the peculiarity that they give priority to the 
[I]t is important to note that most of the loans are for the execution of projects executed by Chinese 
companies in the region, that is, Chinese banks make loans to Latin American and Caribbean 
countries to nance projects carried out by Chinese companies. ese loans are complementary to 
those carried out by other international nancial institutions, they do not substitute them and … they 
have a high concentration both in the countries where they are carried out and in the sectors that are 
nanced (infrastructure, energy and mining). (Roldán et al., 2015: 104) 
9.http://www.paginasiete.bo/economia/2015/10/16/china-dara-credito-millones-para-ejecutar-proyectos-infraestructura-73762.
html, accessed on 17/08/20
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guidelines of their country’s foreign policy: rst, to ensure the provision of natural and energy 
resources, both with investments in these sectors, and with infrastructure that ensures their eciency 
in acquisition; second, to expand and consolidate China’s internationalization policy. Finally, with 
(roughly) the same priority as the other two, Chinese companies seek to achieve high prots from 
their international operations.
Bearing all this in mind when reviewing the Bolivian data, it is evident that Chinese companies here 
follow the same trend as set forth in previous sections of this article. After having almost no presence 
before 2008, it has built up steadily to the point of being highly signicant. We corroborate that this 
greater presence is not due to investments made in the country, but to companies selling their goods 
and/or services in person. is could be seen like any other commercial operation, except for the 
peculiarity that they are mostly Chinese state-owned companies doing business with the Bolivian 
State. is is part of Chinese international co-operation policy; as mentioned by several authors 
(Gallagher et al., 2013; Girado, 2015; Jenkins, 2012), most of the loans have to be executed by 
Chinese companies in the region. 
From the Bolivian point of view, it could be said that the great increase in business with China has 
been an intentional policy since the rst years of Bolivia’s current administration (2006 onwards). As 
stated by Fernando Rodriguez, former Bolivian ambassador to China, before 2008 the bilateral 
relation was so slight that the biggest project was the asphalting of an avenue in the city of La Paz.10 
Indeed, his diplomatic mission had the great objective of turning this situation around. It was during 
his term that the bilateral relation was boosted, initiating the acquisition of the famous Tupac Katari 
Satellite, the rst of many million-dollar purchases.
e company details to be presented next derive from the mapping made for our investigation from 
information found in the media. We should clarify that we worked with secondary sources – mainly 
written press media,11 – due to the impossibility of obtaining ocial data. For a more detailed 
description, check out Annexe 3, which includes detailed information on each company, including 
projects in execution and methods of awarding projects.
Table 7: Sectors in which the Bolivian State hired Chinese companies, 2016
Source: printed media
12Transport and communications
Energy
Manufacture industry
9
7
17
14
8
49%
35%
16%
Number of
companies ProjectsSector %
10. Ocial transcript of the workshop: "América Latina y China ¿Cooperación Sur-Sur o Consenso de Beijing" [China and 
Latin America: South-South Cooperation or Bejing Consensus?], Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, La Paz, June 2014
11. In total, for the current research, 1734 newspaper articles were analysed from 14 newspapers across the country, in the 
period 2014-2016.
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e Bolivian State currently has a contractual relationship with fourteen Chinese companies, who 
have executed or are executing 39 projects. If we disaggregate data according to sector (Table 7), 
almost half of the projects fall into transport and communications (49%), followed by energy 
(35%), then industry (16%). In addition, as seen in the Table 8, according to contractual value, 87% 
of the contracts fall into purchases of services, while 13% purchases of goods.
Complementing the above, if we disaggregate the value of each project according to the funding 
source, we nd that there is a clear dierence between goods and services. In the case of services, only 
43% comes from Chinese loans, while the remaining 57% comes from Bolivian state money and 
loans from multilateral organizations. In the contrasting case of goods, 96% of the nancing comes 
from Chinese loans made to Bolivia.
Respecting hiring procedures, only 16% of all projects were contracted by international public 
bidding, as shown in Table 9, while the remaining 84% were granted by direct invitation or awarded 
by exception. is percentage is excessively high, even compared to the average of the current 
administration. According to one major newspaper investigation:
Table 8: Chinese enterprises hired by the Bolivian State, by type of contract and type of nancing, up to December 2016
Source: printed media
Services
Goods
Concept Amount ($US)
4,867,000,000
712,000,000
87%
13%
47%
4%
43%
96%
11%
0%
Bolivian
Financing
Chinese
Financing
Other
Financing
%
Hiring Procedure
International public bidding
Finished project contract
Direct Invitation
Award by exception
Intention memorandum
%
16%
7%
23%
0%
54%
Table 9: Hiring procedure of Chinese companies by the Bolivian State, up to December 2016
Source: printed media
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Finally, because the presence of Chinese rms is fraught with controversy in every country, the 
mapping in the current research includes the problems and sources of conict which Chinese 
companies are facing in Bolivia. e main nding is the fact that, despite the short period of time 
that these companies have been operating in the country, the conicts they face have followed the 
regional trend; specically, the following issues: 1) compliance with the country’s standards, laws, 
and cultural practices; 2) corruption in the hiring process and the execution of projects; and 3) 
compliance with contracts. 
Regarding the rst, companies like Sinohydro or Vicstar Shenzhen may be cited as having to deal 
with strikes and complaints by workers about labour harassment. Companies like Nanjing 
Construction Group, Sinopec and Hydrochina Corporation have faced strong opposition in rural 
communities where they were executing their projects, mainly on the basis of accusations of 
environmental contamination. Regarding the second issue, the most notorious example is China 
Agricultural and Machinery Corporation (CAMC), who stands accused of unduly inuencing 
Bolivian politics; although many more companies have been accused of corruption. Just three weeks 
before a national referendum on the option of amending the constitution law of Presidential 
re-election, a huge scandal broke that concerned the Commercial Manager of this Chinese company, 
when it became public that the manager was involved in a romantic relationship with the President 
of Bolivia. is, combined with the fact that the majority of the company’s contracts were awarded 
by direct hiring instead of public tender, has given Chinese companies a highly public and negative 
prole. Regarding the third issue, CAMC is the most notorious example, as four projects out of 
seven that they are executing are not operating. is has resulted in claims of more than US$20 
million in performance warranties by the Bolivian State. Even if the media scandals have died down 
for now, they still loom in the background. To mention a few: Sinosteel’s operations were paralysed 
for three months due to company debts; China Railway’s contract was rescinded due to constant 
delays and breaches; and Vicstar Shenzhen’s viaduct bridge in the city of Cochabamba lasted less 
than a year and fell down, and what is worst, the company had increased the price from US$1.3 
million to US$1.8 million. More information about the issues that each company faces may be 
found in annexe 4.
67.53 percent of the state contracts awarded in the 10 years of Evo Morales' Government were through 
direct hiring of a total of 80,665 contracts; while the works awarded by public tender reach 23.05 
percent, according to data extracted from the portal of the State Contracting System (SICOES). e 
data correspond to contracts awarded under the modalities of public bidding, public invitation, direct 
contracting and by exception. Compared to the previous 10 years, the percentages are inverses since in 
that period the contracts were awarded in 59.54 percent through public tenders (out of a total of 5,532) and 
the awards by direct contracting reached only 0.14 percent. (Los Tiempos de Cochabamba)12
 12. http://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/economia/20160309/solo-23-obras-se-licito-publicamente. Reviewed on 28/08/2017
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TENSION BETWEEN THE EMPIRICAL DYNAMIC AND PUBLIC OPINION. 
 Perception
In recent years, a series of corruption scandals involving Chinese enterprises has given rise to the 
politicisation of the debate about the positive or negative aspects of the bilateral relation. ere was 
an assumption that a negative trend in Bolivian public opinion was growing; however, as the debate 
has become ever more politicized, and the bilateral relation has become a contentious issue between 
the Bolivian government and its opposition, it has become more dicult to assess the real scale of 
the anti-Chinese sentiment in Bolivia. is is why, at this stage of our research, it was convenient to 
carry out a representative survey in large and intermediate Bolivian cities. e specic methodology 
of the survey may be found in Annexe 5.
A short time ago, nobody in Bolivian would have thought of China or any other country except the 
U.S. as the most inuential country in the world. However, the rst result of the survey that caught 
our attention was that the Bolivian population is very aware of the geopolitical changes of recent 
years (Figure 10). Indeed, 35% of the interviewees think China is the most inuential country in the 
world. In the realm of geopolitics, the U.S. is still viewed as the most inuential country according 
to our Bolivian sample (45%). 7% of our interviewees considered Japan the most inuential 
country; while 4% considered Germany, ranked at the bottom in this category. 
 
Figure 10: Which of the following countries is the most inuential in the global scene?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
Figure 11: Do you consider relations between Bolivia and China positive or negative?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
4%
7%
9% 1%
35%
45%
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It is interesting to see how these percentages mirror the size of the economies of these countries in 
the global rankings, as well as other results from similar surveys carried out at the global level 
investigating the state of public opinion on geopolitics.13 Probably the most interesting result of the 
survey (Figure 11) is that a plurality of the interviewees (36%) consider relations between China and 
Bolivia to be positive. In second place, 28% of the interviewees see relations in a negative light. 22% 
of respondents expressed a neutral attitude, while 13% preferred not to answer the question. ese 
results reect a divided and politicized public opinion in Bolivia about the status of bilateral relations 
with China. It is worth noting, however, that more than a third of the public is either uninterested 
or unaware of the topic.
It seems that Chinese diplomacy in Bolivia is doing a good job in behalf of its government. As Figure 
12 shows, it has been less eective in behalf of Chinese companies, as a plurality of respondents 
surveyed (39%) stated that the recent entrance of several Chinese companies into the Bolivian 
economy has been negative for the country. Still, we should not overestimate this tendency, given 
that a third of respondents considered the Chinese companies’ entrance to be positive. Finally, close 
to 30% of the population seems either indierent or misinformed about this issue. 
Figure 12: Do you consider positive or negative for the economy, the operation of several Chinese companies in the country?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
Figure 13: Why do you nd Chinese companies negative?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
 13.  See public opinion on geopolitical issues carried out by the Chicago Council of Foreign Aairs and Pew Research for similar 
and related studies. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/search/content/Ranking%20of%20countries%2C%20public%20perception ; 
http://www.pewglobal.org/topics/country-image/
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Deepening the analysis on the reasons why a majority of respondents consider the presence of 
Chinese companies in Bolivia to be negative (Figure 12), it is worth noting that almost half of 
respondents (49%) gave the view that these companies exploit their employees as a key reason why 
they see them in negative terms. at these companies seem to have low environmental standards 
ranked second (43%) in the list of reasons explaining the negative view of these respondents toward 
Chinese companies. Almost a third of them (32%) cited lack of transparency in the way these 
companies manage their business and the contracts they sign with Bolivian counterparts as a reason 
for their negative view. Finally, approximately the same percentage of respondents (31%) believed 
that through these companies the Chinese government has been acquiring too much power over 
Bolivia.
In the following charts we present a ranking of preferences expressed by the respondents as 
motivating their views on the main challenges and benets of the bilateral relation between 
China and Bolivia. Respecting the challenges (Figure 13), 39% of respondents referred to the high 
level of debt as the central issue. e lack of compliance with Bolivian law by the Chinese 
government and Chinese companies was also cited as a challenge by 34% of respondents, followed 
by lack of transparency (33%) and the aim of the Chinese government to dominate Bolivia (24%).
Respecting the benets of the relation (Figure 14), 30% of respondents viewed as positive the 
conditions on which Bolivia obtains access to credit from China; 25% opined that the relation is 
positive because China wants to help developing countries. In contrast, 18% saw no benet 
emerging from the relation. An increasingly close relation between the two countries (15%) and the 
complementarity between them (12%) ranked fourth and fth in the respondents’ order of 
preference. Finally, 12% also cited the fact that both countries share a similar ideology as a positive 
element. It is worth noting that all motives cited by the respondents feature prominently in the 
Chinese strategy of engagement with Latin America (per two White Papers published in 2008 and 
2016). In other words, the survey results show that China has carried out a fairly successful strategy 
positioning the discourse to portray its presence in Bolivia as a strategic partnership between 
Figure 14: Which of the following are problems in the Bolivia-China relationship?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
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countries at similar stages of development; a partnership of mutual support and without ideological 
conditions, in complementary search for development in the 21st century. 
Summarizing the results of our survey on the state of Bolivian public opinion regarding the bilateral 
relationship between China and Bolivia, we can conclude that:
 
 · Mirroring the current global balance of powers and the global state of public opinion on 
 geopolitical aairs, China features as the second most inuential country in the world, 
 according to Bolivian public opinion.
 · e diplomatic presence of the Chinese government in Bolivia is evaluated more positively 
 than the presence of Chinese companies in the Bolivian economy. However, more than a 
 quarter of respondents see the whole bilateral relation as negative.
 · In order of priority, Bolivians indicated: 1) low labour standards, 2) low environmental 
 standards, 3) lack of transparency and its relation to corruption, and 4) an excessive 
 geopolitical dependency, as the main risk factors in the current state of the bilateral relation. 
 · Generally, Bolivian public opinion is divided over how to evaluate the bilateral relation, and 
 an important segment of the population remains indierent.
 · e elements which the respondents indicated as negative or risky reect, to a large extent, 
 the general academic and political debate over the role of China in Latin America: 
 specically, the emergence of a geopolitical neo-dependence as well as the risk of impoverishing 
 labour and environmental standards, and a lack of transparency which can bring more corruption.
 · On the other hand, the bilateral relation’s advantages, expressed by another segment of 
 respondents, are to a large extent aligned with the strategic objectives established by China in 
Figure 15: What are the benets of the Bolivia-China relation?
Source: FES and Pagina 7 Public Opinion Poll
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 its two White Papers on Latin America. In other words, Chinese diplomacy has been – to an 
 extent – successful in positioning its Latin American foreign policy as a search for a 
 complementarity between countries at similar stages of development – a strategy of 
 complementary support, without ideological preconditions, to achieve socioeconomic 
 development in the multipolar world of the 21st Century.
 Reality Check
After analysing the structure and dynamics of China’s increasing presence in Latin America in 
general, and in Bolivia in particular, understanding the real characteristics and magnitude of this 
increased presence, in contrast to the state of the academic and political debates, as well as in vis-à-vis 
the state of public opinion, is becoming increasingly important.
Regarding trade, it is evident a sustained increase in the ows of imports from and exports to China 
has happened, especially since 2005 and 2008, respectively. Concerning imports, China became 
Bolivia’s main trade partner in 2015, supplying a range of manufactures of low-to-medium 
technological content, as well as close to a third of all the capital goods that Bolivia imports generally. 
Regarding exports, one must highlight that, unlike the rest of Latin America, China gures very low 
in the ranking of trade partners to which Bolivia exports. Brazil and Argentina are Bolivia’s main 
export destinations, due to its reliance on the exports of gas and to the existing pipelines between 
Bolivia and these countries. e U.S. is the main importer of Bolivia’s gold, silver and tin; while 
Colombia is the main importer of Bolivia’s agroindustry. Of all Bolivian exports to China, 98% are 
non-manufactured natural resources; while only 2% are manufactures. Finally, at US$1.4 billion, 
Bolivia’s trade decit with China is very high.
In terms of capital ows from and to China as FDI, it is fair to say that this is not relevant at all to 
Bolivia. e bulk of Chinese FDI in Latin America is invested in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Chile. 
e resources invested by China in Bolivia account for less than 1% of the Chinese resources owing 
to the region. From the Bolivian perspective, these have not constituted more than 5% of the capital 
ows to the country at any given time. e main sources of FDI to Bolivia remain European. In any 
case, although FDI from China is low, it is worth noting that it mirrors the regional trend that 
investment is concentrated in two sectors: mining and hydrocarbons, representing altogether 97% 
of the total.
e third element to take into account is the increasing Bolivian bilateral indebtedness to China. 
is form of resources has signicantly increased since 2011. If in 1996 Bolivia owed China US$22 
million, by 2016 this had reached US$608 million, accounting for 80% of Bolivia’s bilateral debt 
and 9% of its overall debt. It is also worth noting that Bolivia has approved a new loan from China, 
for the sum of US$7 billion. is will be the highest debt contracted by Bolivia in its entire history, 
and will increase its external debt by 100%. 
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e fourth factor analysed in the present section is the presence of Chinese companies in Bolivia. 
Given the fact that Chinese FDI in Bolivia is very low, Chinese companies in Bolivia are mostly not 
investing capital but selling products and services to the Bolivian government. Importantly, only 
43% of these sales are funded by the loans given to Bolivia by the Chinese government; the rest is 
directly provided by the Bolivian government or Bolivian state-owned enterprises. Most of these 
enterprises are in the construction sector, in charge of developing infrastructure for the Bolivian 
government to comply with its ambitious state-led development strategic objectives. All of the above 
explains why the presence of these companies has raised scepticism in Bolivian public opinion. ere 
is a long history of corruption scandals in these types of partnership between the Bolivian 
government and construction companies. e presence of Chinese companies has proved no 
exception, and some of these cases have taken an extremely high political prole, such as CAMC 
mentioned above.
CONCLUSIONS.
e growing Chinese presence in Latin America has triggered heated academic and policy debates as 
well as growing levels of internal social and political conict across countries in the region. Against 
this background, the present paper has explored the specic characteristics of this dynamic in the 
Bolivian case, by adopting a novel research strategy in which we tested these debates in Bolivia by 
combining a process-tracing analysis of the evolution of the structural geo-economic relationships 
between Bolivia and China, with a public opinion survey of the negative and positive perceptions of 
the Bolivian population about the issue. _e objective of this methodology was to compare perception 
with empirical dynamics for a more rounded overview of the political implications of the structural 
evolution of the sources of geopolitical power in the bi-lateral relationship.
e main academic and policy debate regarding the relationship between China and Latin America 
gravitates between two poles. On the one side are academics, policy-makers and practitioners 
claiming that with the rise of China, Latin America has a historic opportunity to develop a strategic 
partnership of structural complementarity that will enable the region to break the dependency that 
marked Latin America’s insertion into the international system. Deepening relations with China, on 
this account, would enhance economic growth without compromising political autonomy in the 
search for development. On the other side stand those who claim, on the contrary, that given the 
geo-strategic objectives of China and the structure of its economy, deepening relations will have the 
opposite eect, namely initiating a new wave of dependency for the region, because China will 
demand more natural resources in exchange for exporting ever more technologically developed 
goods. China’s disregard for environmental, labour and transparency standards would make the 
situation even worse, as it would undo all the advances the region has made in terms of political, 
social and third-generation human rights.
From our analysis of the evolution of the China-Latin America geo-economic relation, we found 
that, although the region has undergone economic growth as it deepened its trade with China, the 
main driver of these gains has been Latin America’s increasing export of natural resources, 
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accompanied by a decrease of almost two-thirds in manufactured and one-third in agricultural 
products exported to China. Over the last three decades, China has established itself as the top 
export destination for six out of ten South American countries, and the rst or second source of 
imports for all but one. China is also becoming one of the main sources of FDI and credit for most 
countries in Latin America. e overall picture, then, is one of an increasing trade decit in favour 
of China, which in turn has accelerated China’s export of ever more technologically developed 
products to the region. In ne, the empirical evidence points at a new phase of geo-economic 
dependency in the making. However, it is also true that, aside from the technical and operational 
conditionalities applying to loans and contracts with Chinese companies, the evidence for a 
deterministic rise of a geopolitical dependency ensuing upon the above-mentioned economic 
changes is less clear. 
Turning to Bolivia, the country seems to experience regional trends in the political economy of 
development always within relatively short periods of time and with acute intensity, following 
historical patterns. is is why we consider the Bolivian case very telling of the essence and potential 
directionality of these changes in Latin America’s future.  e region is only relatively important as 
a trade partner for China, while China is becoming absolutely important for the region. Bolivia is 
insignicant for China as a source of imports and destination of exports, but China is becoming one 
of Bolivia’s main export destinations, and it recently became the rst source of Bolivian imports, 
increasingly including products with medium and high technological content. In return, 99% of 
what Bolivia exports to China is minerals, oil and its derivates. It is worth noting that minerals 
during the rst three quarters of the 20th century, and oil and gas as of the late 1980s, has marked 
the modern history of Bolivia as a mono-producer, highly sensitive to external shocks and 
technological changes in the world economy.
Capital ows from China to Latin America have steadily increased since 2000. ese are made up of 
proper investment ows, and loans from the Chinese government, and stand currently at 15% of the 
overall FDI coming to the region. Most of the FDI is concentrated in four Latin America countries, 
with the smallest economies receiving mostly loans. In the case of Bolivia, FDI from China is not 
really important, and is concentrated in oil and gas. Regarding loans, since 2005 China has given 
loans to Latin American countries in larger amounts than the traditional lenders to the region, 
including the IADB and the World Bank; entities that attached these loans to specic 
conditionalities related to labour, environment, transparency standards and, most importantly, 
policy prescriptions. China avoids these conditionalities, but promotes projects tied to imports from 
China and use of Chinese products, companies and workers on the projects in which these loans are 
invested. Bolivia has undergone a similar trend since 2008, except that the main dierence from the 
usual experience of the region is that Chinese FDI in Bolivia is scarce.
 
Bolivia has made increasing use of Chinese loans to fund infrastructure projects, the most important 
of which has increased Bolivian foreign debt by 100%. Many of these funds are used for projects 
carried out by Chinese companies. Moreover, many of these projects fall outside the scope of the 
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Chinese loans, so that the government has had to contract Chinese companies as providers for other 
projects funded by Bolivian taxpayers and by other multilateral agencies such as the CAF.
In any case, the presence of Chinese companies in the region has accompanied the rise of conicts 
due to incompatible cultural practices – environmental, labour and transparency standards amongst 
other issues. Bolivia is not an exception in this regard, and conicts arose between Chinese 
companies and the Bolivian population, particularly on issues like labour standards, environmental 
contamination, and transparency. Some of these conicts have gained political prominence and 
converged with the domestic dynamic of political polarization, such as the case involving President 
Evo Morales and the Chinese company CAMC on the eve of the referendum to change the 
constitutional limits on presidential tenure in 2016. In sum, Bolivia showcases a particularly acute 
version of the new type of conditionality that China has attached to the ow of its capital, and more 
specically of loans to the region.
Our analysis of the state of Bolivian public opinion on the increased presence of China in the 
country shows a society divided in its attitudes. With a third of Bolivians thinking that China is the 
most inuential country in the world (second to those who think the US is), it is important to 
highlight that almost four in ten respondents think the relationship between China and Bolivia is 
positive; while almost a third think the opposite. e main reasons explaining the positive view are 
the alleged lack of stringent conditions attached to Chinese loans and the fact that China wants to 
help developing countries. Bolivia’s increasing debt with China and China’s non-compliance with 
Bolivian legality and transparency standards stand out as explanations for the negative view.
 
In sum, Bolivian society mirrors the academic and policy divide regarding the increasingly 
important role of China in the region. If in the abstract, positive views of China trump negative 
ones; in most all concrete instances, a majority of interviewees showed a negative attitude to Chinese 
companies operating in the country, mostly because they abuse Bolivian workers and, to a lesser 
extent, because they have low environmental standards and are not transparent enough.
ese divided attitudes are far from inconsequential for national and international politics. We have 
seen how attitudes to Chinese companies can quickly escalate and get caught up with decisions 
about the constitution and the overall orientation of policy; as in Bolivia, in the CAMC case and the 
referendum on the limits on presidential terms. is could easily escalate to the level of foreign 
policy decisions and determine the course of foreign policy toward China in Bolivia, especially as it 
is well known that both countries share similar ideological stands on development and international 
aairs. In other words, as China becomes more relevant for the development policies of all countries 
in the region, we may expect that relations with China may become a divisive issue and set the public 
agenda of these countries, including the course of the foreign policy of these countries toward the 
Asian giant.
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ANNEXES.
Annexe 1: Top 5 export and import partners of CAN and MERCOSUR 2015, in %
Data: www.trademap.org
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Annexe 2: Bolivia, top 10 products imported from China, 2015
Data: www.trademap.org
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Annexe 3: Chinese companies operating in Bolivia, Projects and Source of Financing
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Source: printed media
*TGN: General Treasury of the State
** BCB: Bolivian Central Bank
***EASBA: State Sugar Company San Buenaventura
****COMIBOL: Bolivian Mining Corporation
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Annexe 4: Chinese companies in Bolivia and their problems executing project
Source: printed media
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Annexe 5: Methodology of the survey
General methodology
· e used sampling frame was the information of the 2012 National Population and 
  Housing Census.
· e survey was conducted at the national urban and rural level. e total sample was 
  800 cases, the sample size according to the condence interval theorem has an expected 
  margin of error of ± 3.47% and a reliability of 95%.
· e sample was distributed in the 9 departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto and 
  intermediate cities.
· e sampling system used was the simple random, probabilistic, multi-stage, stratied 
  and quotas. 
· It should be noted that due to the size of the sample assigned by Department and 
  Municipality (proportional to their population weight) the result of the data should be 
  considered at the national level. At the departmental or municipal level, the expected 
  errors are very high.
Field Work
· Fieldwork was conducted on Saturday 11, Sunday 12, Monday 13 and Tuesday 14 and 
  Wednesday 15 March 2017. 
· e target population was people older than 18 years residing in Bolivia. ese people 
  were surveyed in their homes.
Distribution of the sample
